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Article
Systematic Review of 
Existential Anxiety 
Instruments
Vincent van Bruggen1,2, Joël Vos3, Gerben 
Westerhof1, Ernst Bohlmeijer1, and Gerrit Glas2,4
Abstract
Existential anxiety (EA) is an expression of being occupied with ultimate 
concerns such as death, meaninglessness, and fundamental loneliness. 
Philosophers and psychologists have claimed its importance for the study 
of human thinking, emotion, decision making, and psychopathology. Until 
now research has mainly focused on death anxiety. Several death anxiety 
instruments have been developed and evaluated. This article is the first to 
review instruments measuring EA in a comprehensive way, that is, by covering 
several existential themes. Such instruments might be useful to gain insight in 
the interrelatedness of the aspects of EA, and application in clinical practice. 
Four models of EA were reviewed and compared resulting in a working 
definition. This definition was used to develop a search strategy that, after 
an initial screening, yielded 532 potentially relevant articles. A total of 78 
instruments were identified, most of them measuring death anxiety. Five 
instruments were included that had a comprehensive perspective on EA. These 
were further evaluated using the consensus-based standards for the selection 
of health measurement instruments (COSMIN) criteria for publications about 
test development. The Existential Anxiety Questionnaire, turned out to be 
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the most thoroughly examined, with promising results. The article concludes 
with recommendations about development and use of EA instruments.
Keywords
anxiety, existential, test development, psychometrics, COSMIN
Introduction
With its origins in the philosophical traditions of great thinkers such as 
Kierkegaard (1843/1954a, 1849/1954b), Jaspers (1913/1946), and Heidegger 
(1927/1979), the concept of existential anxiety (EA) has been embraced by 
many psychologists and psychiatrists (e.g., Deurzen & Adams, 2011; Glas, 
2003, 2013; May, 1950/1977; Ratcliffe, 2005; Yalom, 1980). In addition, 
cognitive psychologists have also shown interest in EA: Terror management 
theory (TMT; Koole, Greenberg, & Pyszczynski, 2006) forms for instance an 
experimental tradition in which hundreds of experiments on EA have been 
conducted in the past decades, mainly focusing on death anxiety.
EA is generally defined as the expression of ultimate concerns about life 
itself, including things such as meaninglessness, death, fundamental loneli-
ness, and lack of certainty. Available literature indicates that in normal cir-
cumstances, most people are quite able to manage these concerns. However, 
there are times (e.g., hardship, adversity, trauma, loss), when people are no 
longer able to cope and they are thrown into existential turmoil (Fuchs, 2013).
EA is an important concept in more than one respect. It can be helpful in 
understanding human behavior and especially the way society tries to deal 
with the basic anxieties. There is, for example, experimental evidence that 
xenophobia and cultural and political conservatism increase when people 
are confronted with their mortality (Solomon, Greenberg, & Pyszczynski, 
2004). EA may also help to understand psychopathology. People with men-
tal health problems are more sensitive to the ultimate concerns of life, some-
times because they have been confronted with these concerns as a result of 
traumatic experiences (Fuchs, 2013). An interesting question is whether EA 
can be seen as a factor that is related to psychopathology, but can be mean-
ingful distinguished. Research on death anxiety has shown that death anxi-
ety is related to neuroticism, state as well as trait anxiety, and different 
diagnostic categories such as depression or generalized anxiety, but more 
research is necessary to clarify this relationship (Neimeyer, Wittkowski, & 
Moser, 2004). Elsewhere we proposed that EA could be an important trans-
diagnostic factor in the understanding of mental health disorders and that 
giving attention to EA can contribute to a person-centered perspective on 
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health and improvement of treatment methods (Bruggen, Vos, Bohlmeijer, & 
Glas, 2013). Sound measurement instruments are necessary for research 
projects to give ground to this claim (Noyon & Heidenreich, 2007). 
Therefore, we aim to perform a systematic literature review of psychometric 
instruments measuring EA. A brief introduction to EA will be given to 
delimit the terrain of this review and help to determine the content validity 
of the instruments at stake. We are well aware that a quantitative approach is 
controversial among adherents of the existential perspective on human func-
tioning. Some eschew the use of standardized measurements in general, and 
regard these measurements as being in opposition to the flexibility and the 
inherent holistic character of human functioning. More about this issue can 
be found in Vos (2013) and Vos, Cooper, Craig, and Correia (in press). We 
start from the proposition that the combination of different scientific meth-
ods helps to get more insight in human functioning, and that a quantitative 
approach has its own advantages and limitations.
Existential Anxiety
When EA is related to the ultimate concerns or limitations of life itself, the 
question arises what exactly these concerns are. In the past decennia several 
models have been presented. We chose models that were developed by Tillich 
(1952), Yalom (1980), Glas (2003, 2013) and TMT (Koole et al., 2006), each 
describing between four and seven concerns. We chose these models because 
they give a formal description of a discrete set of existential concerns, and are 
at the same time diverse enough regarding time of creation and theoretical 
background. A short informal overview of the four models is given in Table 
1, and the concerns are described below, also giving attention to other impor-
tant theorists who did not give a formal classification of concerns. Three 
existential concerns are described in all four models: death, meaninglessness, 
and guilt. Two additional concerns are distinguished in two or three of the 
models: isolation and identity.
Death
Human beings are able to reflect on their mortality and the possibility of 
nonbeing. It is important to note that this anxiety is not limited to concerns 
about the concrete moment of one’s life-ending, but primarily has to do with 
finitude, that is, the very fact that one’s life will end at some (as yet unknown) 
point in time. Tillich (1952) differentiates between absolute and relative vari-
ants of existential concerns. He sees death anxiety as an absolute concern and 
fate, anxiety related to the contingency of happenings, as a relative one. Glas 
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(2003) gives attention to lack of safety, the world as an unsafe place, a lack of 
physical protection, which seems closely related to death anxiety.
Meaninglessness
People are constantly trying to make sense of what occurs in their life, they 
search for meaning and try to find a purpose to live for. The work of Frankl 
(1962) is often mentioned in this regard. Frankl claimed that the search for 
meaning is inherent to the human condition. The experience that in this search 
no help can be expected from an external authority, and that one is responsi-
ble for giving one’s own answers, may give rise to anxiety. Tillich (1952) sees 
emptiness, the breaking down of a once accepted belief system, as a relative 
variant of meaninglessness. Glas (2003) describes anxiety (or other negative 
feelings such as disgust) that is provoked by existence as such, the matter-of-
factness of live. This can be seen as an extreme example of the experience of 
meaninglessness.
Guilt
In the context of EA, guilt has first to do with moral transgressions. Tillich 
(1952), for example, mentions that this feeling may result from not living up 
to one’s own moral standards, and he distinguishes this from an absolute vari-
ant of guilt, namely condemnation, the feeling of not living up to presup-
posed universal standards. Within TMT guilt is seen as one of the moral 
emotions that also include shame (Tangney & Mashek, 2004). However, May 
(1950/1977) and Yalom (1980) see guilt from a different perspective, namely 
Table 1. A Comparison of Models of Existential Anxiety.
Terror management 
theory Tillich Yalom Glas
Death Death and fate Death Death/unsafety
Meaninglessness Emptiness and 
meaninglessness
Meaninglessness Absurdity and 
meaninglessness/life 
as such
Guilt Guilt and 
condemnation
Freedom Doubt and inability to 
choose
Isolation Isolation Isolation
Identity Loss of structure in the 
relation to oneself and 
the world
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as not fulfilling one’s potential. They see life as a reservoir of endless possi-
bilities, but this freedom has also a shadow side, because not all these possi-
bilities can be chosen. That one still is responsible for choosing one’s own 
path in life, can lead to doubt and procrastination (Glas, 2003).
In addition to death, meaninglessness and guilt, two concerns are men-
tioned in two or three models: isolation and identity.
Isolation
Man is an individual who cannot really know what someone else experi-
ences, or how it would feel to be someone or something else. There exists an 
unbridgeable gap between one’s own inner world and that of others. At the 
same time people feel a need to be connected to others. Longing for connect-
edness in the context of this gap in the understanding of other minds, may 
give rise to feelings of fundamental isolation and loneliness. All of our theo-
rists mention isolation as one of the important limitations of life that may give 
rise to EA, although Tillich does not give it a formal place in his typology of 
anxieties.
Identity
In TMT, a fifth source of EA is mentioned, namely, identity, not being able 
to get full self-insight and experiencing unclear boundaries between self 
and non-self (Koole et al., 2006). Closely related to this is Glas’s (2001, 
2003, 2013) description of anxiety related to loss of structure in the rela-
tion to oneself and the world, which is assented to by Ratcliffe (2005, 
2008/2011) who sees existential feelings as background feelings, for 
example, the feeling that something is real (or not) and feelings of homeli-
ness or estrangement.
We do of course not claim that our summary of ultimate concerns is 
exhaustive, or that all existential experiences could be classified with it. We 
merely use it as a starting point in our search for relevant instruments, and 
think it provides a sensible and broad enough coverage of the phenomena 
under study. It must also be noted that all authors of the aforementioned con-
ceptual models state that feelings related to different existential concerns 
strongly overlap and interrelate in the experiences of people. For example, 
when someone is aware of the contingency of occurrences (fate), the lack of 
a system of meaning that could have helped to deal with this contingency, can 
be felt at the same time (meaninglessness), whereas the world may also feel 
strange and uncanny (loss of structure), and the help of other people is 
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believed to be utterly insufficient (isolation). So what may seem sensible 
distinctions to the philosopher or psychologist, may be hard to find as distinct 
categories in everyday experiences or empirical data.
The question whether it will be possible to close this gap between theoreti-
cal descriptions of EA and empirical data, can be answered by using sound 
measurement instruments. This review intends to search for such instru-
ments, whereby the following working definition will be used; EA is the 
negative emotion which may accompany the awareness of the ultimate con-
cerns of life: death, meaninglessness, guilt, isolation, and identity.
In the past decades, several reviews of particular concerns have been pub-
lished, for example, on death anxiety (Missler et al., 2011; Neimeyer, 1994, 
1997, 2003; Wass & Forfar, 1982) guilt (Tilghman-Osborne, 2010), and lone-
liness (Cramer & Barry, 1999). Instruments with a comprehensive perspec-
tive, as intended in this article, may be helpful to gain insight in the mutual 
relationships between different concerns, their role in human functioning, 
and their importance in therapy processes. Such instruments may also be 
more applicable for screening for EA in clinical settings than instrument with 
a specific focus, such as death anxiety. Screening can be helpful for identify-
ing patients who need additional help for dealing with EA.
Instruments focusing on positive existential experiences, such as hope or 
meaning, will not be taken into account. The reason for this is that our 
review focuses on the primary negative experience of the ultimate concerns 
of life, although individuals may of course secondarily reinterpret this and 
experience positive growth. Besides, in our opinion instruments focusing 
on positive existential experiences cannot be seen as measuring the oppo-
site of negative existential experiences: A lack of positive meaning in life 
does, for instance, not necessarily imply that someone experiences life as 
fundamentally meaningless. For a review of meaning in life instruments, 
Brandstätter, Baumann, Borasio, and Fegg (2012) could be read. Park 
(2010) provides an overview of research on meaning in life and important 
conceptual questions.
Thauberger (1982) wrote a review of existential scales that were available 
at that time, describing instruments directed at measuring the confrontation/
avoidance of existential issues, locus of control, sexuality and positive exis-
tential feelings such as hope, but none of these instruments addressed EA as 
described in our definition.
Objectives
The aim of this review is to provide an overview of instruments of EA along 
with information on the psychometric qualities. The following research 
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questions will be answered: (1) which instruments explicitly address EA as 
a broad concept, that is, measure two or more of the five existential con-
cerns?; (2) how is EA defined in the development of the instruments, and 
which concerns are distinguished?; and (3) what is the psychometric quality 
of the instruments?
Method
Procedure
“Searches of three electronic databases (i.e., PubMed, Web of Science, and 
PsycINFO) were completed in November 2012, using the following search 
terms: EXISTENTIAL*, “ULTIMATE CONCERN,” DEATH, FREEDOM, 
MEANINGLESSNESS, ISOLATION, in combination with different terms 
regarding anxiety and test construction and validation. The working defini-
tion given above was used for choosing the search terms. Different combi-
nations of search terms were tried out, striving for a balance between terms 
that covered the whole spectrum of the definition, and were still specific 
enough. For this reason GUILT and IDENTITY were, for example omitted, 
because they are used in many different contexts, and would give too many 
false positive results. In PubMed a search filter developed by Terwee, 
Jansma, Riphagen, and de Vet (2009) was used for the selection of psycho-
metric publications. Figure 1 provides an overview of the procedure. Titles 
and abstracts of all publications were reviewed by the first author to select 
articles regarding the development or use of an EA instrument. To check the 
reliability of the selection, the second author studied a random selection of 
articles and decided on their eligibility. The interrater reliability coefficient 
kappa was 0.88 (SE = 0.042), which may be regarded as very good (Fleiss, 
1981; Landis & Koch, 1977). Out of the selected articles the instruments 
regarding EA were selected, and a differentiation was made between instru-
ments with a general perspective, as intended in this review, and other 
instruments that aimed at specific concerns such as death anxiety or guilt. 
Two experts in the field of EA were consulted, one of them a leading 
researcher in TMT, and the other in the research on meaning in life. Both 
experts confirmed that no relevant instruments were missed. However, after 
the completion of a former version of this article, a reviewer drew our atten-
tion to the Existential Study (ES; Thorne, 1973), and this instrument was 
also included.
The last step was to perform an additional search with the name of the 
instrument as search term and, as far as possible, by personal correspondence 
with the developers, to make sure that all studies using the instrument were 
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included. A complete description of the search strategy can be requested from 
the first author.
Exclusion Criteria
This study aimed at identifying instruments that provide information on the 
interrelatedness of the different forms of EA, and which also appear applicable 
Database search
Title / Abstract: existential* OR death OR freedom OR meaninglessness OR isolation OR “ultimate 
concern” 
AND 
Title / Abstract: anxiety OR anxious OR fear* OR fright* OR terror OR angst OR panic OR dread*
AND
Title / Abstract: questionnaire OR *test OR instru ment OR scale OR measur* OR assess* OR psychometric 
OR cronbach OR valid* OR feasibil* OR reliab* OR reproducib* OR inventory
(PubMed: Instead of these last string of search terms a search filter (Terwee 2009) was used).
Limiters (if available in database): English Language, Humans, Adults.
Number of Studies
PsycINFO: n=1797 
Web of Science: n=3508
Pubmed: n=2770
Total of studies: n=8075
Exclusion of duplicates
Total of studies: n=6152
Screening Title and Abstract 
Total of studies: n=532
-No existential 
instrument used
-Animal study
-<18 population
-No English version of 
instrument available
n=5620Selection of instruments 
Consultation of experts
Total of instruments: n=79
Death anxiety or related: n=64
Guilt: n=2
Isolation: n=4
Hopelessness: n=3 
Ontological insecurity n=1 
Instruments with a general 
perspective on existential 
anxiety: n=5
Publications about these 
instruments: n=11
Total of publications: n=15
Searching for additional 
publications on these 
instruments.
-Personal Correspondence 
with authors.
-Additional search, using 
the name of the instrument.
Additional publications 
found: n=4
Automated:    n=1444
Manual:  n=479
n=1923
Figure 1. Summary of the selection procedure.
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to clinical practice and research projects with adults. Therefore the following 
exclusion criteria were used:
—Population younger than 18 years, when a minor part of the study popu-
lation was older than 18 years, the instrument was also included
—Subscales that are part of an instrument with broader scope
—Instruments that focused only on one concern, for example, death 
anxiety
—Single-item instruments
—Experimental tasks
—Qualitative instruments
—No English version available
After the selection of the instruments all studies regarding these instruments 
were included, also more recent published ones, or studies using a population 
younger than 18 years.
Evaluation of the Quality of the EA Instruments
For each instrument a publication was identified that provided the most 
extensive information on its development and validation. This key publi-
cation was used to evaluate the psychometric quality of the instrument. 
The studies were evaluated using the criteria of the COSMIN statement 
(consensus-based standards for the selection of health measurement 
instruments; Mokkink, 2010; Mokkink et al., 2010; Mokkink et al., 2013). 
These standards were developed in 2005 in an international Delphi study, 
and were tested and improved in the following years. Originally intended 
for the evaluation of patient-reported outcome measures, they are also 
applicable to the evaluation of other measurement instruments. Table 2 
provides a summary of the COSMIN criteria and their meaning. As rec-
ommended by Terwee et al. (2012) a 4-point scale, poor, fair, good, excel-
lent, was used, applying the worst score counts principle. This means that 
the lowest score attained describes the quality of a measurement property. 
When for example structural validity is evaluated, a too small sample 
(less than 5 participants per item) can lead to the classification poor, even 
when other aspects, like the applied statistics, are good enough. It is 
important to note that this scoring system is an evaluation of the method-
ology, and not of the instrument at stake. When an aspect of a study is 
poor, it only means that it cannot be used to evaluate the quality of the 
instrument. In this case, other publications about the instrument were 
searched for additional information.
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Results
Number of Hits and Identified Instruments
At first 8,075 articles were found, 1,923 turned out to be duplicates. The 
remaining 6,152 articles were screened for the use of an EA instrument, 
resulting in 532 articles in which 78 instruments were used. Figure 1 provides 
a flow diagram of the selection process. Most instruments were used to study 
death and dying, just a small number addressed one of the other existential 
concerns. Only five instruments used a comprehensive perspective on EA.
Introduction to EA Instruments
Next, the background and theoretical underpinnings of the five EA instru-
ments are described, followed by an evaluation of their content in relation to 
our working definition and their psychometric quality. Table 3 gives a sum-
mary of the most important psychometric characteristics, and the quality of 
Table 2. Consensus-Based Standards for the Selection of Health Measurement 
Instruments (COSMIN) Criteria.
Criterion Meaning
Internal consistency Show the items of a (sub)scale the expected 
interrelatedness?
Reliability Are the results of the test consistent over two or more 
applications of the test?
Measurement error Do changes in the outcome of the test reflect “true” 
changes in the construct?
Content validity Are the items of the test an adequate reflection of the 
intended construct?
Structural validity Do the scores of the test reflect the dimensionality of the 
construct?
Hypotheses testing Does the (sub)scale relate with other measures in the 
expected way?
Cross-cultural 
validity
Do scores of the test converge in different cultural 
settings?
Criterion validity Does the (sub)scale relate with a “gold standard” in the 
expected way?
Responsiveness Are changes in the construct adequately reflected in the 
outcome of the test?
Interpretability Is it possible to interpret changes in the outcome of the 
test in a way that is meaningful to the field of interest?
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the studies in which the instrument was evaluated. Measurement error, cross-
cultural validation, criterion validity, and responsiveness are not used in the 
following description, because they were described for none of the five 
instruments. All instruments were developed for scientific purposes, and 
none were evaluated regarding their clinical applicability.
The Existential Study (Thorne, 1973)
Thorne (1973) based the Existential Study (ES) on actual patient communica-
tions, collected in psychiatric practice. Using these data, he developed the 200 
items of the ES, which he defined as a questionnaire “. . . designed to measure 
Self-concepts, Self-status, Self-esteem, Self-actualization, existential morale, 
demoralization, meanings of life, attitudes toward the human condition, and 
destiny, suicide, and existential success-failure” (Thorne, 1973, p. 387). The 
author also refers to a classification and nomenclature for existential state 
reactions (Thorne, 1970), but the relationship of this classification with the ES 
is unclear. The answer format of the ES is true/false. Examples of items are 
“Life seems to be passing me by,” “Things are rapidly going to hell in the 
world,” and “Sometimes I hate myself for the way I have messed things up in 
life.” Thorne (1973) tested the ES with 1,309 respondents from different 
groups: felons, alcoholics, philosophy students, psychology students, unmar-
ried mothers, and patients with a primary diagnosis of chronic undifferentiated 
schizophrenia. Basic statistical information about the respondents, the proce-
dure and the features of the test, like the reliability, is lacking or incomplete. 
Pishkin and Thorne (1973) performed factor analysis on the total sample and 
the different subgroups, resulting in a five-factor solution that accounted for 
27.3 % of the total variance. Beforehand they hypothesized that the scale 
would reflect three underlying factors, namely concerns regarding the self, 
concerns regarding relations with others, and concerns regarding the world, 
but it is not clarified how the results of the (explorative) factor analysis relate 
to this expectation, leaving aside the question whether it makes sense at all to 
distinguish factors that account for small percentages of variance such as 2.5% 
or 1.8%. Thorne and Pishkin (1973) also compared the response patterns of 
the different groups of respondents. They found a different score pattern for 
schizophrenic patients, and lower scores for students compared with all clini-
cal groups (including felons). Psychology students and philosophy students 
also showed differences, the latter showing less existential problems. The 
authors do not provide information on significance levels.
Evaluation. Besides the initial publications in Journal of Clinical Psychology, 
no references to the ES could be found, and the reason for this seems to be 
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clear. The ES seems to have found its end in ill-performed statistics and con-
ceptual confusion, although the authors started their project in a way that was 
promising, namely by analyzing patient reports, and a strength of their study 
is that they used diverse groups of respondents. The authors refer to different 
classifications of experiences that may underlie their instrument, without 
clarifying how these classifications interrelate. The unclear theoretical foun-
dation makes it also hard to say to which extent the ES resembles our defini-
tion of EA.
Existential Anxiety Scale (Good & Good, 1974)
Good and Good (1974) based their scale on the writings of Frankl (1962). 
They renamed his central concept of existential vacuum as EA. A clear defini-
tion lacks, but they give the following description: “Compared with neurotic 
anxiety, then, EA is more the product of despair than distress, of alienation 
than guilt, of emptiness than fear” (p. 72). The writings of Frankl were used 
to formulate the 32 items, which mainly relate to feelings of meaningless-
ness. A true/false response format is used. Examples of items are “I frequently 
have the feeling that my life has little or no purpose’” and “I mostly feel all 
alone in the world.” The authors tested the EAS with 237 respondents (under-
graduates), correlated it with a test anxiety scale and an achievement motiva-
tion scale, and found the expected inverse relationships for need for 
achievement but not for test anxiety. Due to major flaws in the key publica-
tion, and the absence of supplementary information in other publications, not 
much can be said about its reliability and validity.
Hullett (1994) tested the EAS with 461 graduate and undergraduate stu-
dents, and found the expected correlations with the Purpose in Life Scale, the 
Seeking of Noetic Goals Test, and the Back Depression Inventory, but not 
with addictive behavior (instrument unknown), spirituality (instrument 
unknown), age, and number of close friends. Brookings and Serratelli (2006) 
used the scale as part of an instrument to measure well-being and found par-
tial support for the expected relationship with instruments for positive illu-
sions (Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding Self-deceptive Positivity 
subscale and the How I See Myself Questionnaire).
Evaluation. Although different concerns as mentioned in our definition of 
EAS can be recognized in the items of the EAS, the renaming of existential 
vacuum as EA is in our opinion a conceptually confusing step. There can be 
more contexts in which EA emerges than situations of meaninglessness, and 
it is debatable whether the EAS is indeed an instrument with a broad perspec-
tive on EA. No information is given about the development of the content of 
 at Vrije Universiteit 34820 on December 9, 2014jhp.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
18 Journal of Humanistic Psychology 
the scale, and it is unclear to what extent the content of the scale reflects dif-
ferent existential concerns, and whether it is a measure of anxiety at all, since 
anxiety or related terms are not used in the items. So its content validity is 
evaluated as poor. The authors presented their scale as preliminary, and 
although it was used in two other studies, the conclusion must be that it never 
surpassed this state.
Existential Anxiety Scale (Bylski & Westman, 1991)
Bylski and Westman (1991) developed a scaleconsisting of 20 items, includ-
ing 6 filler items. The article mentions wrongly 28 items (A. S. Westman, 
personal communication, August 13, 2013). The scale expresses Yalom’s 
description of EA, which has to do with death, freedom, meaninglessness, 
and isolation. The respondent is asked to indicate on a 5-point Likert-type 
scale to which extent he worries about this subject. Examples of items are “I 
worry about being lonely and without anyone to understand me” and “I worry 
about my own death.”
The authors tested the EAS with 63 respondents (students and their family 
and friends), and found the expected correlations with a measure for defense 
style (Short Repression-Sensitization Scale) but not with religiosity (items 
from different scales). The test showed to be quite stable over a period of a 
week (product–moment correlation: .74).
Westman (1992) used the EAS in a study with 82 students, and correlated 
it with the Denial Questionnaire and the Conceptualization of Self and of 
Death Questionnaire. She found expected correlations with identity diffusion, 
despair about life, denial of death and less extension into tasks, but not with 
conceptualization of death, religiosity, egocentricity, and irresponsibility.
Evaluation. The EAS is based on one of the theories that was used to formu-
late our working definition, and different aspects of it can be recognized in 
the items. The authors claim that the scale has face validity, but the informa-
tion about its development is sparse, and it is unclear how the different aspects 
of the underlying theory have contributed to the content of the scale. The 
EAS was tested with only small samples, and not much can be said about its 
psychometric qualities, except that it showed acceptable stability over two 
measures.
Fear Scale (Walters, 2000)
The Fear Scale (FS) was developed by Walters (1998) as part of his theory 
about delinquency and substance abuse: the lifestyle theory. The author states 
 at Vrije Universiteit 34820 on December 9, 2014jhp.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Bruggen et al. 19
that “the incentive for lifestyle development is grounded in fear” (Walters, 
1998, p. 13), and he argues that this fear is the natural consequence of the 
conflict between the instinct to survive, and a constantly changing environ-
ment that challenges survival. This fear can according to Walters become 
existential in organisms with self-awareness. He mentions three categories 
that relate to the issue of survival: the ability to band together into groups, to 
predict and control the environment, and to have a sense of one’s identity and 
existence within a wider context.
The FS consists of 18 items, and the question whether these are or have 
been a personal source of apprehension or concern to the respondent. In cor-
respondence with the three categories mentioned above, there are the follow-
ing subscales: bonding, orientation, identity. Examples of items are 
“intimacy,” “commitment,” “weakness,” “vulnerability,” “disapproval,” 
“insignificance.” The respondent is asked to mark the items that are a per-
sonal concern to him, and these are summed up.
The author tested the scale with 98 federal prison inmates, and correlated 
it with newly developed instruments concerning outcome expectancies for 
crime and negative consequences of crime (Walters, 2000). The internal con-
sistency of the EAQ seems to be sufficient (coefficient α Social Scale = .66, 
Control Scale = .72, Identity Scale = .69). Testing of the underlying three-
factor structure using confirmatory factor analysis was only moderately sup-
portive (goodness-of-fit index [GFI] = .86 and root mean square residual 
[RMR] = .07), after elimination of three items the scale showed better fit 
(GFI = .91 and RMR = .06). There is also some preliminary support for its 
construct validity, since the FS (version with three items deleted) did stronger 
relate to outcome expectancies for crime than a scale measuring (experi-
enced) negative consequences of crime. This was predicted in the lifestyle 
theory, describing EA as an important factor in choosing criminal activities as 
an aspect of lifestyle preferences.
Walters (2001) also used the FS in a study with 135 male inmates, and 
found significant correlations with the State-Trait Inventory, and with both of 
its subscales when controlling for the other subscale, which was seen as pre-
liminary support to the notion that existential fear is sensitive to both dispo-
sitional and situational based anxiety. In this article also information about its 
stability is given, although it is not clear how these data were collected (test–
retest reliability after 2 weeks: Total Scale = .74, Social Scale = .51, Control 
Scale = .63, Identity Scale = .66).
Evaluation. The categories of the FS relate to three concerns of our working 
definition; isolation, identity, and death (with the impossibility to control the 
environment as one of its aspects). Interesting is that the author grounded his 
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theory about the important role of EA in evolutionary psychology. It is 
unclear how the items of the FS were developed, and whether they cover the 
underlying concept, so the content validity of the scale is poor as is its face 
validity: At first glance the scale does not look as an instrument of EA or even 
anxiety at all, for it is unclear what “being a personal concern” of items such 
as “intimacy” or “commitment” has to do with anxiety.
Existential Anxiety Questionnaire (Weems, Costa, Dehon, & 
Berman, 2004)
The Existential Anxiety Questionnaire (EAQ) (Weems et al., 2004) is based 
on the theory of Tillich (1952), and consists of 13 items which represent three 
domains that each contain a relative and an absolute existential concern: fate 
and death, emptiness and meaninglessness, guilt and condemnation. Examples 
of items: “I often feel anxious because of feelings of guilt” and “I often think 
about death and this causes me anxiety.”
The authors tested the EAQ with two samples of students (225 and 326, 
respectively) and found support for its test–retest reliability (.72) after a 
period of 2 weeks and its internal consistency (.71 and .76, respectively). It 
can be questioned whether it would have been better to measure the internal 
consistency for each of the three factors and not for the Total Scale, a point of 
view which would have led to a rating as poor for this aspect (Mokkink et al., 
2013). As the factors were strongly correlated, we think it is plausible not to 
regard them as subscales and to mention only the consistency of the Total 
Scale. Mentioning the internal consistency of the factors would even not have 
been appropriate at all, as the number of items for each of the factors is very 
small. Confirmatory factor analysis was only moderately supportive of the 
proposed three factor structure: GFI = .92 and root mean square error of 
approximation (RMSEA) = .064 (Study 1) and GFI = .90 and RMSEA = .090 
(Study 2). The scale correlated in the predicted way with instruments for 
anxiety and depression (Symptom Check List 90-R and Inventory of 
Depressive Symptomatology) and purpose in life (Purpose in Life Scale) and 
had incremental validity beyond the Purpose in Life Scale in predicting 
depressive symptoms.
Berman, Weems, and Stickle (2006) tested the EAQ with 139 adolescents 
(15-18 years) and found additional support for the factor structure of the 
EAQ and the hypothesized associations with psychological symptoms (Brief 
Symptom Inventory-18) and identity issues (Ego Identity Process 
Questionnaire). Scott and Weems (2013) tested the EAQ with 386 adults who 
were exposed to hurricane Katrina, and found support for most of the expected 
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correlations with PTSD (PTSD checklist) and suicidal ideation (Brief 
Symptom Inventory-18). The EAQ was also translated into Chinese, Slovak 
and Polish, but no data are available yet on psychometric evaluation (C. F. 
Weems, personal communication, February 25, 2013).
Evaluation. The categories of the EAQ are based on one of the models that 
was used in our “Introduction” section, so it is not surprising to find its con-
tent overlapping with three of the categories of our working definition: death, 
meaninglessness, guilt. The items of the final EAQ were selected on the basis 
of their item–total correlations. Although the author gives a broad description 
of the underlying theory we do not know much about the development of the 
content of the scale, and whether it covers the intended construct, so the con-
tent validity must be evaluated as poor. Promising evidence is given for the 
other psychometric aspects.
Discussion
We started this article with the research question, which instruments explic-
itly address EA as a broad phenomenon, how they define EA, and which 
concerns they distinguish. The conclusion is that in a period of four decades, 
only five instruments with a broad perspective on EA were published, and 
each of them was used in just a few studies. This may be related to the highly 
abstract and maybe also normative character of the concept of EA. The small 
number is in strong contrast with the large amount of instruments developed 
to measure death anxiety, supposedly the most concrete one of the ultimate 
concerns.
The instruments that were evaluated show considerable differences, 
although each of them is explicitly presented as an EA instrument. The EAS 
(Good & Good, 1974) focuses mainly on feelings of meaninglessness. The 
ES (Thorne, 1973) and the FS (Walters, 2000) use both their own conceptual 
model, although the latter reflects three of the concerns in our working defini-
tion: identity, death, and isolation. The EAS (Bylski & Westman, 1991) and 
the EAQ (Weems et al., 2004) most closely fit our working definition, but 
both do not cover all five ultimate concerns.
With respect to the psychometric quality of the instruments, Table 3 shows 
that all studies have one or more major flaws, that is, a rating of a property as 
poor. Most notable is the lack of evidence for the content validity. For each 
of the instruments it is unclear how the content was developed and, when 
described, it seems to be the work of one or more scientists, also the 
developer(s). Consultation of expert panels, or pretesting of an instrument 
with a sample of the intended population, could have given more strength to 
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the claim that an instrument indeed measures one or more existential con-
cerns, and that all items were necessary to measure this concept in the 
intended population.
Next, there turn out to be differences between the older instruments, the 
ES and both EA scales, and their evaluation studies and the newer ones. The 
latter used more sophisticated methods to evaluate the reliability and struc-
tural and convergent/divergent validity. Both EA scales used students as 
research population, and the Fear Checklist was tested with inmates. Only the 
ES and the EAQ have been tested with different populations.
All instruments were tested in the United States, the country in which they 
were developed, and with an English-speaking population. EA can be 
expected to be a highly culturally sensitive topic, as turned out with research 
on death anxiety (Neimeyer et al., 2004), so it is questionable whether these 
instruments can also be used in other cultures. The same applies to the setting 
in which the instruments were tested. It is unclear whether instruments that 
were tested with normal adults, survivors of a hurricane, or inmates also can 
be used for clinical purposes, and how burdensome the completion will be for 
people with (mental) health complaints.
The conclusion of this review is that at this moment there is no instrument 
that completely covers the concept of EA, as defined in our working defini-
tion. We found some instruments that are relevant to the concept of EA, but 
none of them could be fully evaluated regarding its psychometric properties. 
The EAQ was the most thoroughly evaluated, and was also used in different 
contexts, with promising results.
Limitations
As far as known, this article is the first attempt to systematically evaluate 
scales with a broad perspective on EA, and this can be seen as a strength. 
Problematic is that we had to use our own definition of EA, because a gold 
standard is lacking. In our working definition, we have focused on anxiety, 
but it is obvious that other emotions also play a role, and maybe different 
emotional patterns are typical for each existential concern. So it is debatable 
whether our definition of EA was not too narrow. Another problematic aspect 
of our working definition is that the different forms of EA are quite diverse. 
Death, for example, may be seen as an objective “given of existence,” but for 
meaninglessness this is more complicated, because the question whether life 
“is” meaninglessness or meaningful depends on a personal judgment. 
Illustrative is a recent study (Heintzelman & King, 2014) in which is posited 
that most people experience life as meaningful.
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Another weakness is that most of the selection of the articles was done by 
just one researcher, although a reliability check turned out well. The possibil-
ity that a relevant instrument would be missed, was reduced by checking the 
reference lists of the key publications, and by consulting experts in the field 
of existential psychology. Despite this systematic procedure, we missed one 
relevant instrument: the ES. We were made aware of the ES by one of the 
reviewers. One of the reasons we did not find the instrument with our search 
strategy, is that all publications about it lack an abstract. One other reason is 
that none of the titles of these articles contains the combination of search 
terms that was needed. This could have been prevented with a full-text search, 
but given the broad range of our search terms this was not feasible, because 
it would have induced enormous numbers of hits. We believe that our search 
strategy was sensitive enough to reasonably claim that we have included all 
relevant instruments. There remains a possibility that we missed instruments 
published in nonscientific journals, or journals that do not provide abstracts.
Suggestions for Further Research
As mentioned above, more attention should be given to the development of a 
new instrument before it is tested with larger samples. Another challenge is 
to clearly demarcate the concept of EA, whereby our working definition can 
be used as a starting point. Qualitative research, such as a Delphi project, or 
interviews with experienced experts, could help to get more conceptual clar-
ity, and get input for further test development. Method bias is an important 
problem in social science research (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, & Podsakoff, 
2012). This problem may occur when different constructs are measured with 
the same method, like self-report questionnaires. In this case, there is a risk 
that at least a part of the covariation between the constructs is caused by shar-
ing the same method, because respondents may show the same response style 
on different instruments, for example, mainly giving affirmative answers. 
This has importance for our review, as most studies only presented correla-
tions between different self-report measures. Weems et al. (2004) are the only 
authors recognizing the problem of method bias: They recommend using dif-
ferent measurement methods in future research. Podsakoff et al. (2012) men-
tion some other remedies for method bias. The first is separating different 
measures in time or psychological proximity, for example by using different 
cover stories. This remedy may be of help, although the authors also admit 
that its effect is still uncertain. A proper formulation of the instrument is also 
important, because ambiguity of items will increase response bias. At last, 
there are also statistical procedures available that can help to diminish the 
influence of method bias.
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Another problem in research on anxiety regards a specific response bias: 
The validity of EA instruments may be threatened by the fact that defense 
mechanisms play a profound role in coping with anxiety, and especially death 
anxiety, which is for instance shown by research on TMT (Koole et al., 2006). 
Because of defense mechanisms, it will not be clear whether low scores are 
caused by the absence of anxiety or by defense mechanisms. So it is preferred 
to cross-validate self-report instruments of EA with other measures of anxiety, 
such as galvanic skin response or behavioral measures, or to use instruments to 
control for defensiveness. Qualitative methods could also contribute to the 
interpretation of test results. It would, for example, be informative to interview 
high and low scorers on an EA questionnaire with regard to their experiences 
with anxiety, defense mechanisms, and attitude to the ultimate concerns.
An important aspect in the further development of EA instruments will 
also be to make them suitable for application in different cultural settings and 
in a clinical context. The development of clinically useful measures can, as 
was stated in our “Introduction” section, help to ground the claim that it is 
important to speak with patients about their feelings with regard to the funda-
mental concerns. Important questions in this regard are to which extent EA is 
distinguishable from psychopathology, and whether EA indeed adds to our 
understanding of psychopathology and treatment outcome. Another question 
is whether EA constructs are unidirectional or bipolar: “Experiencing mean-
ing in life” does for instance not seem to be the opposite to “the meaningless-
ness of life,” instead it appears to be a different phenomenon/dimension, as 
we mentioned in our “Introduction” section.
We recommend using the EAQ as a starting point in future research proj-
ects on EA, and expand its content, so it better covers the existential concerns 
as described in different theories. That expansion might be an option in future 
research, was already suggested by the authors of the original version (Weems 
et al., 2004). Validation in other cultures, and combining the EAQ with exist-
ing instruments for existential concerns—for example, death anxiety instru-
ments—might give more ground to its validity, and clarify the emotional 
reactions related to different ultimate concerns.
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